Trump Makes Ex‑Maduro VP Delcy Rodríguez Primary U.S. Partner in Post‑Raid Venezuela Despite Prior DEA 'Priority Target' Tag
After the U.S. raid that ousted Nicolás Maduro, President Trump has made former Maduro vice president Delcy Rodríguez the Biden‑era U.S. government's primary partner in Caracas—holding calls and meetings, dispatching CIA Director John Ratcliffe, pressing for the expulsion of suspected foreign intelligence personnel, asserting indefinite U.S. control over seized Venezuelan oil (announcing 30–50 million barrels to be sold at market price), meeting with Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips, and completing an initial $500 million sale while U.S. forces interdicted tankers tied to sanctioned shipments. The shift has drawn scrutiny because AP‑obtained DEA files reportedly designated Rodríguez a 2022 DEA "priority target" — a label used for major drug‑trafficking or money‑laundering suspects — and she had been previously sanctioned by the U.S., even as she publicly calls for opening Venezuela’s oil sector and continues prisoner releases amid regional protests over raid casualties.
📌 Key Facts
- After the Jan. 3 U.S. raid that removed Nicolás Maduro, President Trump has made former vice president Delcy Rodríguez—previously sanctioned and described as a U.S. 'pariah'—the U.S.’s primary partner in Venezuela; the CIA secretly assessed Maduro‑aligned officials like Rodríguez were best positioned to maintain short‑term stability, CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Caracas to meet her and other senior officials, and CBS reported CIA groundwork for the raid (clandestine in‑country team, a human asset tracking Maduro, and a replica compound used for training).
- AP‑obtained DEA files show U.S. drug‑enforcement intelligence maintained files on Rodríguez since at least 2018 and designated her a DEA 'priority target' in 2022 (a label used for individuals believed to play significant roles in major trafficking/money‑laundering operations); the DEA has not publicly accused her of criminal wrongdoing and declined comment on the report.
- The White House is asserting control over Venezuelan oil: Trump said 30–50 million barrels will be provided to the U.S. at market price and overseen/sold by Washington (proceeds to 'benefit the people' and, per administration statements, be spent on U.S.‑made goods); the White House calls its role effectively 'indefinite,' completed a first sale valued at about $500 million, and has scheduled meetings with Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips while saying it will mobilize U.S. oil companies to help rebuild Venezuela’s oil sector—though oil CEOs say Venezuela is currently 'uninvestable' without major legal and commercial changes.
- U.S. forces and the Coast Guard have interdicted multiple Venezuela‑linked tankers (including the Russian‑flagged Marinera, formerly Bella‑1, and vessels such as Olina), boarding ships under court warrants amid concerns about a 'dark fleet' using AIS spoofing and carrying irregular armed guards; some vessels have been tracked returning to Venezuelan waters, Russia has protested, and U.S. officials say crews may face prosecution under seizure orders.
- The administration is pressing Rodríguez’s interim government to expel suspected intelligence agents from China, Russia, Cuba and Iran (limited to suspected spies, not regular diplomatic staff), Secretary of State Marco Rubio has proposed measures such as an 'oil quarantine,' and the White House has warned Rodríguez that failure to comply could prompt another U.S. military operation; officials are also linking resource deals to stepped‑up deportation flights in a new hemispheric 'dynamic.'
- Casualties and public reactions: Venezuelan officials reported at least 24 Venezuelan security officers killed and 'dozens' of officers and civilians dead in the raid, Cuba says 32 Cuban officers assigned to Maduro’s security detail were killed and returned to Havana where tens of thousands protested outside the U.S. Embassy; Pentagon figures show seven U.S. service members injured (five returned to duty, two recovering), Venezuelan state‑organized rallies and military tributes have followed, and U.N. human‑rights experts have questioned the legality of Maduro’s abduction under international law.
- Domestically in Venezuela, acting President Delcy Rodríguez has taken conciliatory public positions toward Washington—calling to open the state oil industry to foreign investment, proposing sovereign wealth funds for oil proceeds, and pledging further prisoner releases—while critics and rights groups say many claimed releases remain unverified and about 800 political prisoners may still be jailed; Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello is said to be coordinating the release process.
- U.S. policy emphasis: senior U.S. officials (including Energy Secretary Chris Wright) are prioritizing a 'functioning' Venezuelan government financed by oil and minerals exports over near‑term democracy or elections, seeking exclusive commercial access for U.S. firms without government subsidies, and sidelining opposition figures (the White House declined a public meeting with opposition leader María Corina Machado while offering a private session).
📊 Relevant Data
U.S. economic sanctions on Venezuela have been identified as a root cause of the country's economic crisis, significantly contributing to the mass migration of Venezuelans by exacerbating poverty, hyperinflation, and lack of essential services.
Economic Sanctions: A Root Cause of Migration - Summary — Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)
Venezuelan emigration has resulted in a cumulative birth deficit exceeding 500,000 since 2014, equivalent to about a year without births, accelerating population aging with the proportion of elderly (65+) being 10% larger than it would have been otherwise.
The crisis-driven shifts of Venezuelan migration patterns — N-IUSSP
Among Venezuelan emigrants, the proportion of older adults over 55 increased to 12% in 2021 outflows from 5% in 2014-2017, while 63.6% of emigrants abroad by 2021 were aged 15-45, contributing to labor market dysfunction and increased caregiving burdens in Venezuela.
The crisis-driven shifts of Venezuelan migration patterns — N-IUSSP
Venezuela's ethnic composition is approximately 51% mestizo, 43% white (including Europeans and Arabs), 3.6% Black, and 2.7% Indigenous, with migration potentially altering these proportions as certain groups may be overrepresented in outflows.
Demographics of Venezuela — Wikipedia
U.S.-led sanctions caused Venezuela to lose oil revenue equivalent to 213% of its GDP between 2017 and 2023, directly contributing to economic factors driving migration.
They Are Making Venezuela's Economy Scream: The Eighteenth Newsletter (2025) — Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
📊 Analysis & Commentary (3)
"A conservative City Journal critique accusing The New York Times of reflexive, politically motivated attacks on the Trump administration’s Venezuela‑related seizures and oil‑control policy, defending the administration’s actions and arguing the paper misstates legal and strategic realities."
"The piece criticizes the White House plan to seize and run Venezuelan oil — calling it theft that undermines law, diplomacy and economic sanity — and argues that taking foreign resources will not produce sustainable prosperity and instead creates legal, operational and geopolitical hazards."
"The WSJ opinion argues that capturing Nicolás Maduro is not enough—Diosdado Cabello and the regime’s remaining power networks must be removed for U.S. stabilization and an eventual democratic transition to succeed, and it critiques the current U.S. approach of proclaiming control while leaving those actors in place."
🔬 Explanations (6)
Deeper context and explanatory frameworks for understanding this story
Phenomenon: US military intervention to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro
Explanation: To enforce drug trafficking indictments against Maduro while invoking the Monroe Doctrine to counter foreign adversarial influences from Russia, China, and others in the Western Hemisphere, thereby securing strategic assets like oil
Evidence: The US justified the operation as a law enforcement action linked to drug charges, but analysts point to broader geopolitical aims, including preventing foreign powers from establishing bases in the region, as evidenced by official statements and historical doctrine application
Alternative view: Primarily motivated by promoting democracy and addressing humanitarian crises in Venezuela, as per some think tank analyses
💡 Complicates the narrative of a simple law enforcement raid by emphasizing underlying geopolitical rivalries and resource control motives over surface-level drug charges
Phenomenon: US demand for Venezuela to expel Chinese, Russian, Cuban, and Iranian agents
Explanation: To sever Venezuela's economic and military ties with US adversaries as a condition for sanctions relief and increased oil production, aiming to reduce rival influences in Latin America and enhance US regional dominance
Evidence: Reports indicate the demands are explicitly linked to allowing US oil companies access, supported by unnamed officials describing the pressure to cut ties with these nations to facilitate energy deals
💡 Challenges the implicit narrative of bilateral cooperation by revealing it as part of broader great power competition and strategic exclusion of rivals
Phenomenon: US arrangement to receive 30-50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil
Explanation: Driven by US energy security interests to access Venezuela's vast reserves amid global supply disruptions, while using oil revenues to stabilize the region and offset costs of intervention
Evidence: Analysis from energy policy experts highlights how US actions aim to integrate Venezuelan oil into markets under American influence, supported by data on reserves and post-intervention economic strategies
Alternative view: Primarily a humanitarian effort to benefit Venezuelan people through economic aid, rather than US energy gains
💡 Differs from coverage focusing on mutual benefits by underscoring US economic incentives and long-term energy strategy as primary drivers
Phenomenon: US military intervention in Venezuela to capture Maduro and secure oil access
Explanation: Enabled by institutional enablers in Trump's second term, including unchecked executive power and advisors like Marco Rubio and Stephen Miller, allowing unilateral actions to assert hemispheric dominance, drawing from historical precedents of Latin American interventions
Evidence: Comparison to 1989 Panama invasion where US captured Manuel Noriega; institutional 'logroll' among advisors with disparate agendas but no unified post-capture plan, contrasting with more checked past interventions like Iraq
Alternative view: Primarily motivated by enforcing drug trafficking charges against Maduro without deeper institutional reform
💡 Complicates typical coverage of decisive victory by emphasizing risks of power vacuums, civil war, and need for extensive nation-building, akin to failures in Iraq and Afghanistan
Phenomenon: Tying Venezuelan oil barrels to US actions and expulsion of foreign agents
Explanation: To compensate US oil companies for assets expropriated under Hugo Chávez, enforcing international arbitration awards through regime change and revitalizing the oil sector for revenue generation
Evidence: ConocoPhillips' nearly $9 billion arbitration win over expropriated projects; Venezuela's oil production decline from 2.5 million to less than 1 million barrels per day under Maduro, creating opportunity for US firms to recover losses
Alternative view: Oil as a means to fund broader geopolitical goals like reducing migration and curbing cartels
💡 Shifts narrative from simple resource grab to addressing historical economic grievances and enabling sustainable development, similar to US-supported oil growth in Guyana
Phenomenon: Post-intervention oil deals and economic arrangements with Venezuela
Explanation: To enable multilateral economic stabilization through IMF-anchored debt restructuring and aid packages, addressing Venezuela's broader collapse and preventing rent-seeking that perpetuates instability
Evidence: Proposal for $50 billion IMF package over 18-24 months for fiscal financing and debt restructuring, drawing lessons from Iraq where prioritizing creditors over recovery led to insurgency; Venezuela's distressed billions in debt requiring multilateral involvement
💡 Challenges implicit narrative of US-led quick fixes by highlighting need for massive international cooperation to avoid repeating past reconstruction failures
📰 Source Timeline (23)
Follow how coverage of this story developed over time
- Details the release of Rosa Carolina Chirino Zambrano, a Venezuelan woman imprisoned for more than a year on espionage charges tied to alleged plots to kill Nicolás Maduro, along with her friend and a taxi driver.
- Provides firsthand account from Peruvian‑American former detainee Renzo Humanchumo Castillo, who says he was accused of being a CIA‑sent 'professional hitman' plotting to kill Maduro and Diosdado Cabello and describes torture at El Rodeo prison.
- Notes Castillo was freed in a July 2025 prisoner swap, but his wife remained detained until this week and that he now hopes to bring her to the U.S.
- AP‑obtained documents show the DEA has maintained intelligence files on Delcy Rodríguez since at least 2018.
- Those files included a 2022 designation of Rodríguez as a DEA 'priority target' across multiple U.S. and international field offices.
- The DEA 'priority target' label is reserved for individuals or organizations believed to play a significant role in major drug‑trafficking or money‑laundering operations affecting the U.S., according to a 2008 DEA assessment.
- DEA has never publicly accused Rodríguez of criminal wrongdoing, and the agency declined or did not respond to comment on the AP report.
- The Fox piece reinforces that Trump recently told reporters he spoke with Rodríguez, praised her as a 'terrific person,' and said the U.S. is 'getting along very well with Venezuela.'
- WSJ underscores that during Trump’s first term Delcy Rodríguez was a 'pariah' sanctioned by Washington for corruption and mismanagement that left Venezuela’s economy in tatters.
- It notes she oversaw the intelligence agency that rounded up and tortured dissidents and publicly blamed U.S. sanctions—not Maduro’s socialist rule—for hunger and medicine shortages.
- The article states that since the Jan. 3 U.S. military raid that ousted Nicolás Maduro, Trump has made Rodríguez the U.S.’s primary partner in Venezuela, framing the main 'upside' for Trump as avoiding a costly military occupation to install a new democratic leader.
- Energy Secretary Chris Wright says he expects to secure U.S. oil and critical‑minerals deals with Venezuela in the next few weeks and is planning a trip to Caracas.
- Wright explicitly frames the goal as giving the U.S. exclusive access to key Venezuelan resources while insisting there will be 'no money from our government, no subsidies' and that American involvement will be via commercial investment in a 'more stable business environment.'
- The article underscores that the administration is prioritizing a 'functioning' Venezuelan government financed by oil and minerals exports over near‑term democracy or elections, backing acting President Delcy Rodríguez, her brother Jorge Rodríguez and security chief Diosdado Cabello.
- Axios reports that Trump refused to publicly meet with opposition leader and Nobel laureate María Corina Machado, agreeing only to a private Oval Office session so as not to 'send the wrong signal' to Rodríguez in Caracas.
- A White House adviser says Venezuela accepted 200 deportees on a recent flight and that the administration is aiming for two to three such deportation flights per week as part of a new hemispheric 'dynamic' linking oil/mineral exports to stepped‑up removals.
- Wright publicly denies that the U.S. is 'taking' Venezuela’s resources and claims Venezuelan officials are 'thrilled' because current oil flows are heavily corrupted and sold at a deep discount mostly to China.
- CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Caracas on Thursday to meet acting President Delcy Rodríguez and other senior Venezuelan officials at President Trump’s direction.
- U.S. and Venezuelan officials discussed intelligence sharing, economic stability, and ensuring Venezuela is no longer a safe haven for U.S. adversaries, especially narco‑traffickers, according to a U.S. official quoted by Reuters.
- Trump said he had a 'very good call' with Rodríguez the same day, publicly calling her 'terrific' and promising a 'spectacular' U.S.–Venezuela partnership covering oil, minerals, trade and national security.
- Rodríguez announced that her government will continue releasing prisoners detained under Nicolás Maduro in what she called a 'new political moment.'
- Confirms that Cuba has organized a mass, state-led demonstration of tens of thousands outside the U.S. Embassy in Havana on Jan. 16 to protest the U.S. raid in Venezuela.
- Provides visual and on-the-ground detail that the 32 Cubans Cuba says were killed were officers assigned to Maduro’s security detail and that their ashes were honored in flag-draped urns in Havana the previous day.
- Includes a major public speech by President Miguel Díaz-Canel accusing the current U.S. administration of ushering in an 'era of barbarism, plunder and neo-fascism' and vowing Cuba will not make political concessions despite Trump’s threats to cut off Venezuelan oil and money.
- Adds that Trump has publicly demanded Cuba 'make a deal' with him before it is 'too late,' without specifying terms, and that Cuban officials publicly reject any 'political concessions' as part of talks.
- Rodríguez used her first state of the union address to call for opening Venezuela’s state‑run oil industry to greater foreign investment, urging lawmakers to pass reforms guaranteeing foreign firms access to the country’s reserves.
- She explicitly framed a “new policy” in Venezuela in response to U.S. pressure and the Trump administration’s stated plan to control Venezuelan oil export revenues, proposing that proceeds flow into two sovereign wealth funds for health care and infrastructure.
- While condemning Maduro’s capture as a "stain" on relations, she struck a conciliatory tone toward Washington, calling for renewed diplomacy and saying, "Let us not be afraid of diplomacy," in a notably brief, 44‑minute speech that broke with past anti‑U.S. diatribes.
- Rodríguez said her government would continue releasing prisoners detained under Maduro, though rights groups have only verified a small share of the releases she claims, and she insisted she would defend Venezuelan sovereignty even as she accepts rapid warming with the U.S.
- CIA Director John Ratcliffe secretly traveled to Caracas and met for two hours with interim President Delcy Rodríguez, the first Cabinet‑level U.S. visit to Venezuela since the U.S. operation that removed Nicolás Maduro.
- A U.S. official says Ratcliffe warned Rodríguez that Venezuela must stop serving as a safe haven for U.S. adversaries and narcotraffickers and discussed potential economic collaboration.
- CBS confirms a closely held CIA analytic assessment that concluded Maduro‑aligned officials like Rodríguez were best positioned to maintain short‑term stability after Maduro’s removal.
- CBS details prior CIA groundwork for the Jan. 3 Maduro raid, including a clandestine in‑country team, a human asset tracking Maduro, and construction of a replica of his compound for training.
- The article notes U.N. human‑rights experts have publicly questioned the legality of the U.S. abduction of Maduro under international law.
- Cuba’s government says 32 Cuban officers serving in Nicolás Maduro’s security detail were killed in the Jan. 3 U.S. raid that seized him in Caracas.
- Tens of thousands of Cubans held a state-organized demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy in Havana on Jan. 16 to protest the raid and demand Maduro’s release.
- Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel publicly labeled the Trump administration an era of 'barbarism, plunder and neo-fascism,' rejected any 'political concessions' to Washington, and vowed Cuba will not negotiate under pressure despite U.S. threats to cut off Venezuelan oil.
- The remains of the 32 officers were flown back to Cuba Jan. 15, honored at the Armed Forces Ministry, and scheduled for burial across provincial capitals after nationwide memorial ceremonies.
- Acting President Delcy Rodríguez held her first press briefing since Maduro’s Jan. 3 capture and pledged that releases of prisoners detained under Maduro 'has not yet concluded.'
- A Venezuelan human‑rights organization estimates about 800 political prisoners remain jailed, including political leaders, soldiers, lawyers and civil‑society members.
- President Trump said he had a 'great conversation' and a 'long call' with Rodríguez and claimed they are 'getting along very well with Venezuela.'
- Rodríguez said 'crimes related to the constitutional order are being evaluated' and vowed that 'messages of hatred, intolerance, acts of violence will not be permitted,' signaling limits on who may be freed.
- Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello is described as coordinating the prisoner‑release process, which critics say has been slow and opaque.
- The piece underscores that Trump has effectively sidelined opposition leader and Nobel laureate María Corina Machado by endorsing Rodríguez as acting president, despite having sanctioned her earlier for human‑rights violations.
- An administration official says the U.S. has completed the first sale of Venezuelan oil, valued at $500 million, with further sales expected in coming days and weeks.
- White House spokeswoman Taylor Rogers calls the arrangement a 'historic energy deal with Venezuela' brokered after Maduro’s arrest and confirms Trump’s team is brokering talks with U.S. oil firms to invest in rebuilding Venezuela’s oil infrastructure.
- The White House reiterates that proceeds from U.S.-controlled Venezuelan oil sales will be split among Venezuelans, U.S. companies and the U.S. government at Washington’s discretion, and that Venezuela’s share is to be spent only on American-made goods.
- ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods told Trump in a White House meeting that Venezuela is currently 'uninvestable' without major legal and commercial changes, citing two prior expropriations of Exxon’s assets there.
- A CBS News/YouGov poll cited in the piece finds a majority of Americans say the U.S. should have 'not much' or 'no' control over Venezuela following the operation to capture Nicolás Maduro.
- Trump’s new social‑media post explicitly labels him 'Acting President of Venezuela' and 'president' of the country, in the context of U.S. management of Venezuela after the raid.
- He told the New York Times that he expects U.S. oversight of Venezuela to last 'much longer' than six months or a year, contradicting any notion of a brief caretaker period.
- The White House spokeswoman’s response to questions about whether the post was a joke sidestepped the substance and instead lauded Trump as the 'greatest President for the American and Venezuelan people in history.'
- Identifies specific tankers from a Venezuela‑linked flotilla — including M Sophia, Olina, Merope, Min Hang and Thalia III — and reports that four which left in 'dark mode' have been tracked returning to Venezuelan waters.
- Says PDVSA and TankerTrackers.com reported three of those vessels (Merope, Min Hang, Thalia III) back in Venezuelan waters late Friday.
- Describes U.S. forces’ pre‑dawn seizure of the Olina by Marines and sailors from Joint Task Force Southern Spear supported by the USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group.
- Reports PDVSA’s claim that the Olina was subsequently released back to Venezuela even after its seizure.
- Links these ship‑level interdictions to Trump’s Jan. 9 White House meeting with major oil companies, where he portrayed U.S. control as providing "total safety" and said firms would "deal with us directly" rather than with Venezuela.
- Specifies that one of the seized 'dark fleet' tankers is the Russian‑flagged Marinera (formerly Bella‑1), taken in the North Atlantic after tracking by USCGC Munro under a U.S. court warrant.
- Adds a formal Russian Foreign Ministry statement accusing the U.S. of stoking tensions and threatening international shipping with the seizure.
- Clarifies that Rubio says Venezuela has agreed the U.S. can sell 30–50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil with proceeds used to buy U.S.-made goods, aligning with but adding detail to earlier '30–50 million barrels' references.
- Confirms that U.S. military and Coast Guard personnel boarded and seized the Russian‑flagged Marinera (formerly Bella‑1) between Iceland and the U.K. on Jan. 7, 2026, after it flew a false flag and was deemed stateless while transporting sanctioned Venezuelan oil.
- Identifies that ownership of the Marinera had recently been transferred to newly formed Russian firm Burevestmarin LLC, which is listed as registered owner, ship manager and commercial manager.
- Reports that Nordic‑Baltic 8+ governments and NATO partners are increasingly worried about 'dark fleet' tankers carrying unauthorized personnel, including irregular armed guards, which analysts say is highly unusual outside high‑risk piracy/Houthi zones.
- Quotes White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt rejecting Russian demands for special treatment of the Marinera’s Russian crew and stating that the crew will be subject to prosecution under the judicial seizure order.
- Notes that dark‑fleet crews on such vessels are typically multinational, often with a Russian master and Chinese, Indian or Filipino crew, and that European authorities have begun sanctioning and holding captains personally liable for deceptive practices like AIS spoofing and going dark.
- The White House is now publicly characterizing its intent to sell Venezuelan oil under U.S. control as 'indefinite,' not just a temporary arrangement tied to specific initial cargoes.
- The PBS NewsHour piece ties the earlier‑reported seizure of two tankers directly into this 'indefinite' sales policy as operational examples of how the U.S. will assert control.
- It underscores that this oil‑control push is being communicated in tandem with rhetoric about possibly seizing Greenland, illustrating how the Venezuela oil plan fits into a broader resource‑ and territory‑focused foreign policy narrative.
- Maritime intelligence analyst Michelle Wiese Bockmann of Windward estimates that 30–50 million barrels of Venezuelan crude equates to about 15 very large crude carrier (VLCC) shipments headed to the U.S.
- Windward/Vortex data show about 47 million barrels of crude and condensate were shipped from Venezuela in December, providing a baseline for comparison with the new flows.
- Windward is already tracking four Western-linked tankers sailing for Venezuela, with two tankers reported as arriving at the Jose Terminal on Jan. 5 and 6 and two already sailing for the U.S. on Jan. 2 and Jan. 6.
- The article reports that these cargoes will be taken by storage ships to the U.S., and that U.S. refineries are configured to process Venezuela’s heavy crude, suggesting limited infrastructure bottlenecks.
- It reiterates that DOJ, DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard have seized a Venezuela-linked tanker in the North Atlantic, tying that seizure into the broader pattern of redirected sanctioned oil shipments.
- Reiterates that President Trump says the U.S. will be "overseeing and selling" Venezuela's oil and that Venezuela will be "turning over" 30–50 million barrels of oil at market price.
- Adds that Trump has a scheduled White House meeting with U.S. oil executives on Friday to discuss running Venezuela’s oil sector.
- Restates that Trump has warned Venezuela to cooperate or face another U.S. military intervention.
- Specifies that the 30–50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil Trump referenced will be provided to the U.S. at market price, not as confiscated cargo, with proceeds pledged to benefit citizens of both countries.
- Adds that the White House has organized a Friday meeting with top executives from Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips to discuss how U.S. oil companies could help reopen and modernize Venezuela’s struggling oil sector.
- Provides updated casualty figures from the Caracas raid: Venezuelan officials say at least 24 Venezuelan security officers were killed and that 'dozens' of officers and civilians died overall, while Cuba reports 32 of its personnel killed.
- Reports Pentagon figures that seven U.S. service members were injured in the raid, five of whom have returned to duty, with two still recovering from gunshot and shrapnel injuries.
- Captures Delcy Rodríguez’s public remarks dismissing Trump’s threats and invoking God as determining her destiny.
- Describes state‑organized pro‑government rallies in Caracas and a Venezuelan military video tribute to the fallen, indicating how the interim government is publicly framing the raid and its casualties.
- Trump’s statement here specifies that the 30–50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil will be provided at market price, and he pledges to use the proceeds "to benefit the people" of both countries.
- The White House has scheduled a specific Friday meeting with executives from Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips to discuss U.S. investment and technical involvement in reviving Venezuela’s oil sector.
- The article reports updated Venezuelan casualty figures from Caracas officials — at least 24 Venezuelan security officers killed — and that Venezuela’s attorney general will investigate the deaths as a “war crime.”
- Delcy Rodríguez’s public response is quoted in more personal, religious terms, framing her stance toward Trump’s threats.
- Public reaction inside Venezuela is described, including state‑organized mass rallies in Caracas and a military Instagram tribute video vowing to rescue the "legitimate President" and dismantle alleged foreign terrorist groups.
- A U.S. official says the administration is explicitly pressing Venezuela’s interim government to dismiss all suspected intelligence agents from China, Russia, Cuba and Iran.
- The expulsion request is narrowed to suspected spies and other intelligence personnel and does not extend to regular diplomatic staff.
- Trump has warned that Delcy Rodríguez’s failure to comply with U.S. demands could lead to a second U.S. military operation in Venezuela.
- Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly suggested an "oil quarantine" to force Venezuela’s new leadership to meet U.S. objectives and increase leverage over refining Venezuelan crude.
- Fox article adds that Trump framed the Iraq comparison by saying former President George W. Bush 'didn’t keep the oil,' contrasting that with his Venezuela policy.
- Reports that in an MS NOW interview with Joe Scarborough, Scarborough summarized Trump’s stance as 'We’re going to keep the oil,' and Trump agreed, emphasizing rebuilding Venezuela’s oil facilities while keeping control of the oil.
- Details that Trump said he plans to 'mobilize major U.S. oil companies' to invest 'billions of dollars' to repair Venezuela’s oil infrastructure so it can 'start making money for the country.'
- Provides additional production/reserves context: cites analytics firm Kpler and notes Venezuela holds more than 300 billion barrels of proven reserves and that output has fallen from about 3.5 million barrels/day in the late 1990s to roughly 800,000 barrels/day.
- Notes that American oil firms have not yet confirmed plans to return to Venezuela despite Trump’s stated intention to involve them.